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REGULATING AUTOMOBILE POLLUTION:  AN 
ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS STORY FOR DEMOCRACY? 
CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER* 
I.  TWO VIEWS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND 
POLITICS 
For at least the past four decades, national environmental law and policy 
have been subjected to intense scrutiny, much of it producing withering 
criticism.1  The criticisms have not been at all unified.  Existing environmental 
law and programs are attacked by some because they are too strict, inflexible 
and expensive.  At the same time, others attack those same laws and programs 
because they are inadequate, insufficiently bold and under enforced.  
Regardless of where a specific analysis comes out on such bottom line 
questions, both the too-tough and the too-lax schools have contributed two 
distinct types of critique to our environmental understanding.  One type 
articulates and defends a substantive position with regard to what the content 
of our environmental policies ought to be.  Here, the too-tough and the too-lax 
viewpoints can be as critical of the other as each is of existing policy; indeed, 
each regularly implies that existing policy is troubled largely because it has 
 
* Charles S. Murphy Professor of Law and Professor of Public Policy Studies, Duke University.  
A.B., Princeton Univ., 1968; M.Div., Yale Univ. 1971; J.D. Univ. California at Berkeley (Boalt 
Hall), 1974.  This essay is based upon a presentation given at “Ten Years After the Clean Air Act 
Amendment of 1990:  Have We Cleared the Air?” at Saint Louis School of Law on November 17, 
2000.  My thanks to Doug Williams, Amy Hoch, and all the students at Saint Louis University 
School of Law who made this event a congenial and stimulating forum. 
 1. The end of the millennium, nearly coinciding with the thirtieth anniversary of Earth Day, 
produced a wealth of comprehensive reviews and analyzes of environmental law and policy, and 
many of these provide overviews of the major criticisms.  See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, A New 
Generation of Environmental Regulation? 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 27-38, plus sources cited in n.1 
(2001).  An excellent recent analysis of the shortcomings of the pollution control elements of 
environmental law and policy is J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL 
IN THE UNITED STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM (1998).  Comprehensive overviews of the 
deep ecology criticisms of current policies are harder to find than overviews of the economics-
based criticisms.  A useful examination of environmental ethics and some exploration of the 
policy prescriptions that flow from non-anthropocentric traditions is PETER S. WENZ, 
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS TODAY (2001).  See also MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE 
EARTH (1988). 
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been unduly influenced by the other.  A second type of critique concentrates on 
the political processes that produce our environmental policies.  Work in this 
second stream tends to show more commonalities than does the work in the 
first.  Analysts who think policy is too tough often see the same deficiencies in 
the political system, as do analysts who think policy is too lax. 
Contributors to the first stream, the policy failure stream, endorse some 
normative policy objectives and techniques and then argue that existing laws 
and regulations do a very poor job in achieving those objectives.  The 
economic theory of environmental policy, for example, has produced 
numerous analyses articulating and defending a theory of optimal pollution and 
promoting market-based or incentive-based regulatory techniques.2  The great 
majority of such analyses then identify particular aspects of existing laws and 
regulations that are unsatisfactory when judged against this theory.  To say that 
the economic theory of environmental policy necessarily concludes that 
environmental programs are too strict, too expensive or too rigid would be a 
false over-simplification; some prominent environmental initiatives have 
benefited from economic analyses that found existing policies to be too 
lenient.3  Most of the contemporary work in this genre fall into this category, 
however.  Economic environmental theory is much more likely to be too-tough 
than too-lax. 
Other philosophical and intellectual traditions produce work in the policy 
failure stream that faults environmental policy for not going far enough, nor 
being bold enough.  Non-anthropocentric theories of rights and justice, for 
example, advocate greater protection for flora, fauna and ecosystems, which 
can lead to criticisms of the Endangered Species Act for its narrow focus on 
critical habitats and species on the brink of extinction, as opposed to broad 
ecosystem management.4  Conservationists advocate commitment of greater 
 
 2. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 27-38. 
 3. Removing lead from gasoline, perhaps the single most outstanding success story in the 
control of auto emissions, was preceded by a cost-benefit analysis showing that the limitations on 
lead content then in effect did not go far enough.  New research into the adverse health effects of 
airborne lead showed that the health costs of any lead in gasoline were well in excess of the 
performance and maintenance benefits from its continuing use.  See Robert Percival, Checks 
Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 188 (1991).  More generally, an analysis of twelve different regulatory 
cases at EPA found that in five of the cases studied, cost-benefit analysis provided support for 
regulations more stringent than originally proposed by EPA.  See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AT EPA: 
ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT (Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997) (the five cases were 
visibility protection for the Grand Canyon, emissions of organic chemicals, reformulated 
gasoline, lead in drinking water, and lead in gasoline). 
 4. E.g., Michael J. Bean, Taking Stock: The Endangered Species Act in the Eye of a 
Growing Storm, 13 PUB. LAND L. REV. 77, 83-85 (1992); Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions 
Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1029, 1132-1136 (1997). 
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acreage of roadless wilderness areas.  Theorists of environmental justice find 
existing programs unresponsive to the distributive claims paramount to that 
theory.5  Many deep ecologists promote a steady-state economy, or a 
Conserver Society, and on those grounds advocate numerous changes in life 
style, energy infrastructure, consumption patterns and the use of renewal 
resources, and find much American environmental policy to be indifferent to, 
or even to be incompatible with, most of these prescriptions.6 
The diverse works in the policy failure literature thus reflect the rich array 
of normative perspectives that our culture and traditions bring to bear on 
questions of environmental policy.  In one fundamental respect, however, they 
all share a common orientation.  Each contribution to the policy failure 
literature argues from a normative ideal entirely outside the context of the 
political processes through which actual policy is developed, enacted and 
implemented, and each assesses actual programs currently on the books solely 
with regard to how those programs fall short of carrying out that normative 
ideal.  This style of criticism has a long pedigree.  However, insofar as such 
work is written with a view toward moving actual policies in the direction of 
its ideal, it suffers from a significant defect.  By bracketing any analysis of the 
political processes through which proposals for policy change must proceed if 
they are to be realized, the policy failure literature implicitly relies upon the 
motivational force of good ideas alone to effectuate change.  It was just this 
“idealistic view” that George Stigler castigated in 1971 when he wrote that 
“preach[ing] to the commissioners or to the people who appoint the 
commissioners” is useless as a method for reforming policy, because it ignores 
“the basic logic of political life.”7 
The second stream of critical environmental scholarship, the political 
failure stream, takes seriously Stigler’s observation.  Political failure criticism 
seeks to understand the motivations of political actors and the dynamics of 
political institutions so as to explain how the basic logic of political life 
produces our environmental policies.  Although ostensibly concerned with 
explaining and criticizing process, much of the work in the political failure 
stream lacks a clearly articulated normative theory of politics as process.  
 
 5. See, e.g., Sheila R. Foster, Meeting the Environmental Justice Challenge: Evolving 
Norms in Environmental Decsionmaking, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10992 (Nov. 2000); Sheila R. 
Foster, Justice From the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the 
Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 775 (1998); 
Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Paradigm 
Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1998). 
 6. See, e.g., ROBERT C. PAEHLKE, ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE FUTURE OF 
PROGRESSIVE POLITICS (1989). 
 7. George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 1 BELL J. OF ECON. & 
MANAGEMENT SCI. 1 (1971), reprinted in CHICAGO STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 209, 225-
226 (George Stigler ed., 1988). 
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Instead, the same substantive policy norms that establish the regulative ideals 
of the policy failure literature do so here.  Political failure analysis then 
identifies explanations for why actual policy deviates from these policy ideals. 
For example, the rational choice branch of political failure analysis grows 
out of the same economics tradition that produced the economic theory of 
optimal pollution, embracing the same policy goals and the same list of evident 
policy failures.  These include faulting environmental policy for not basing 
pollution policy on cost-benefit analysis, for employing performance standards 
instead of financial incentives or market-based programs such as emissions 
trading as regulatory instruments, for mandating nationally uniform standards 
that fail to take into account local variations in both the costs and the benefits 
of controls, for regulating new sources of pollution more stringently than older 
sources, for failing to prioritize regulatory targets so that the worst are 
regulated first and for condoning wide discrepancies across regulatory 
programs in costs per unit of health or environmental benefit.8  Rational choice 
theory develops a theory of the basic logic of political life, which purports to 
explain why these undesirable features of actual policy have come into being 
in lieu of the preferred policies. 
For rational choice, the sources of these policy defects can often be found 
in the advantages concentrated economic interest groups have in organizing to 
gain political success as compared to diffuse groups of environmental 
consumers, be we breathers of clean air, drinkers of clean water, or people who 
enjoy wilderness or believe in the preservation of species.9  Because they are 
better able to surmount collective action problems so as to offer reelection 
assets and services to politicians, the auto manufacturers, the steel industry, the 
makers of petrochemicals and pesticides, the electric power industry, the 
timber industry and similar others have more assets and services to trade with 
politicians in exchange for favorable policies.  The discrepancy between the 
regulations of old versus new sources of environmental damage, for instance, 
 
 8. Stewart, supra note 1, at 27-38. 
 9. For a summary of the general rational choice presumption in favor of large concentrated 
interests, see Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment 
Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969-73, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 29 (1998).  See 
also Richard Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation, A Response 
to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 542 (1997) (“The logic of collective action would suggest that 
the large number of citizen-breathers, each with a relatively small stake in the outcome of a 
particular standard-setting proceeding, will be overwhelmed in the political process by 
concentrated industrial interests with a large stake in the outcome.. . .”); Daniel A. Farber, Politics 
and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 56, 60 (1992) (rational choice theory 
predicts “that environmental groups will not organize effectively and . . . environmental statutes 
will not be passed”).  Of course, the most general prediction from rational choice—that 
environmental laws will not exist—has not been borne out by experience.  Rational choice theory 
makes numerous more micro-level predictions, however, that are more consistent with the 
observed facts.  See text accompanying note 12-14. 
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purportedly reflects the success of existing industry to raise costs of entry for 
potential rivals.10  Other types of regulation, such as the Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration Regulations under the Clean Air Act, purportedly 
demonstrate the ability of the rustbelt states to negate the competitive 
advantage for attracting new industry that cleaner areas of the country might 
have if the costs of environmental controls reflected localized cost/benefit 
considerations.11 
This interest group oriented rational choice explanation of political failure 
seems more plausible when applied to the details of environmental 
implementation, where it bears some kinship with earlier agency capture 
theories, than it does as a creation story.12  Whereas the economic theory of 
optimal pollution finds many existing policies to be too strict, rational choice’s 
commitment to the comparative advantage of concentrated economic interest 
groups over diffuse environmental interest groups predicts that environmental 
legislation will be lax or non-existent.13  The history of enacting the original 
environmental legislation of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s cannot easily be 
made to fit such a model.14  To explain those enactments, the idea of symbolic 
politics frequently comes into play.15  Occasionally, the conviction that 
“something needs to be done” to address a particular social concern becomes 
politically salient enough to a sufficient segment of the voting public that 
 
 10. See generally Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 
1025 (1983).  More broadly, rational choice theorists have developed a political theory of 
regulation, which analyzes ways in which certain segments of industry might use regulations to 
create barriers to competition.  For a review of the arguments, see Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the 
Political Economy of Global Environmental Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749, 750 (1999); Todd 
Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of 
Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845 (1999); Michael T. Maloney & 
Robert E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation, 25 J.L. & ECON. 
99, 100 (1982); James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, Polluters’ Profits and Political 
Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 139 (1975). 
 11. See, e.g., B. Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests are Being 
Protected? 23 ECON. INQUIRY 551 (1985). 
 12. See Wiener, supra note 10, at 750 (“[Rational choice] theory has difficulty explaining 
the origin of national environmental law: indeed, it suggests that diffuse environmental benefits 
and concentrated compliance costs will yield no environmental legislation. [It] does provide a 
more robust explanation of regulatory content, demonstrating that rent-seeking by concentrated 
interests can distort the hidden details of regulation.”). 
 13. For a review of the theory of collective action as it has been applied to enacting the 
original wave of environmental legislation, see Schroeder, Rational Choice vs. Republican 
Moment Explanations for Environmental Law, supra note 9. 
 14. Id. 
 15. E.g., John Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 
(1990).  For a review of the role of symbolic politics, see Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate 
Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal Law Enforcement? 80 B.U. L. 
REV. 1227, 1247-1253 (2000).  The locus classicus of this approach to political failure is the work 
of Murray Edelman.  See MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964). 
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politicians cannot avoid responding in some fashion.  The general 
inattentiveness of the public to the actual workings of public policy, however, 
enables elected officials to placate the public by enacting laws that are 
symbolically and rhetorically tough, but ultimately ineffective, thereby 
placating public sentiment while not imposing any substantial costs on their 
most important interest group supporters.16 
There are other strands within the rational choice literature, but these 
illustrate the two core conclusions of political failure analysis, which in one 
way or another exhaust the possibilities: either minority interests have too 
much influence on the outcomes, or majority interests do.  The economic 
theories of environmental politics are not the only ones to reach such 
conclusions.  A variety of non-economics based analyses lead to similar 
results.  Within the deep ecology literature, majoritarian political failure has 
perhaps been a more frequent focus of attention compared to rational choice’s 
emphasis on minority interest domination.  The deep ecology critique of 
majority preferences isn’t that they produce regulation that is too tough; rather, 
those preferences result in policies that are insufficiently transformative.  
Responsibility for such majority political failure is placed on the social, 
cultural and economic conditions that produce those preferences.17 
A prominent example is William Ophuls’ Ecology and the Politics of 
Scarcity, which argues that majoritarian democratic government will be unable 
to make the hard choices required to turn the path of human development away 
from a cataclysmic limits to growth crisis and toward conditions of sustainable 
development.18  While green scholarship has long since shied away from 
Ophul’s recommended solution—highly authoritarian government—much of 
that scholarship agrees with Ophuls insofar as it argues that politics as 
currently practiced will be unable to make the correct environmental choices 
and that it needs to undergo significant transformations in order to achieve 
sustainable development.19  Driven by ever expanding demands for material 
and consumption goods and underwritten by a refusal to understand the limits 
 
 16. See, e.g., Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty 
Years of Law and Politics, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 249, 292-95 (1990) (describing the 
combination of interest group and symbolic politics theories in environmental lawmaking).  On 
the symbolic benefits of the 1970 CAAA, see Helen Ingram, The Political Rationality of 
Innovation: The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, in APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING AIR 
POLLUTION 20-23 (Ann F. Friedlaender ed., 1978). 
 17. This tendency within deep ecology was memorably encapsulated in Pogo’s remark, “We 
have met the enemy and he is us.”  See Walt Kelly, at http://www.bpib.com/kelly.htm (last visited 
May 30, 2001). 
 18. WILLIAM OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY (1977). 
 19. See, e.g., ROBERT C. PAEHLKE, ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE FUTURE OF 
PROGRESSIVE POLITICS (1989).  See also DEMOCRACY AND GREEN POLITICAL THOUGHT (Brian 
Doherty & Marins de Geus eds., 1996) (collection of essays explaining the connections between 
democratic participation and deep ecology). 
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to growth, majoritarian politics will be unwilling and unable to make the 
decisions necessary to become the Conserver Society that is required for the 
long term well being of the planet and of humankind.20 
Criticism of the excessive influence of concentrated economic interests is 
certainly not absent in the green political failure literature, as well.  Such 
groups as Public Citizen and the Nader inspired PIRGs often seek to expose 
the disproportionate influence of organized interest groups by tracing the level 
of campaign contributions from various interests and using those contributions 
to explain the votes of elected officials.21  This green minority failure analysis 
shares much in common with its rational choice interest-group dominance 
counterpart.  Overall, the green literature has surveyed existing environmental 
policy and politics and found the picture of political failure to be as dismal as 
does the economics-inspired political failure scholarship. 
As even this short and incomplete review shows, elements within the 
policy failure and the political failure streams flow from a diverse set of 
origins.  The two streams also concentrate on quite different questions.  The 
policy failure literature identifies the policies we ought to have and the 
political failure literature explains why politics prevents us from getting there. 
Notwithstanding their many differences, almost all the contributions to either 
literature are united by at least one shared view.  Each views the relationship 
between policy and politics as one in which ideal policy has clear normative 
priority over politics.  The policy failure literature often reads as if politics did 
not exist.  The political failure literature takes normative policy success as the 
criteria against which to judge politics.  First it identifies the policy ideal, next 
it concludes that actual policy fails to achieve the ideal, then it develops an 
explanation for the divergence in terms of minority or majority influence, 
either of which is treated as undesirable to the extent it deflects public policy 
from the ideal.22  Throughout, policy and politics stand in relationship to one 
another as goal does to obstacle.  The result is a decidedly dismal picture of 
our environmental policies as well of our prospects for improving them. 
 
 20. PAEHLKE, ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE FUTURE OF PROGRESSIVE POLITICS, supra 
note 19, at 217-272 (describing deficiencies of current political attitudes and outlining the changes 
necessary for progressive environmentalism to succeed). 
 21. See Public Citizen’s analysis of the relationship between gambling industry campaign 
contributions and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott’s “little-known legislative actions that 
protected the casino industry,” at http://www.citizen.org/congress/reform/betting.htm (last visited 
May 25, 2001); the Stop the Rollback campaign of the state PIRGs, aimed at protecting 
environmental laws from being weakened by “powerful polluters,” at 
http://www.stoptherollback.com/fact.html (last visited May 25, 2001). 
 22. Compare Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial 
Review? 101 YALE. L.J. 31 (1991) (arguing that rational choice theory cannot judge whether an 
interest group has excessive influence until it adopts substantive norms for determining the 
correct policy outcome, after which the group that influences deviation from that outcome is said 
to have excessive influence). 
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Both a practical and a conceptual reservation need to be raised against this 
shared understanding and its most dreary implications.  Practically speaking, 
the environmental facts are more positive than this picture suggests.  Take the 
economic theory of optimal pollution. The policy failure viewpoint harshly 
criticizes policy that falls short of the goals of efficiency and cost-
effectiveness. Holding policy to a standard of perfection, however, risks 
overlooking a good result in the search for the ideal.  An alternative evaluation 
scheme would find positive value in policies that moved in constructive 
directions, whether or not they achieved perfection.  Judged against such an 
alternative scheme, many of our environmental programs score well. While 
each of our environmental programs might be unable to satisfy a standard of 
being the most cost-effective means to any specific environmental objective, 
the vast majority of them have produced benefits that exceed their costs, thus 
satisfying a minimal cost-benefit test.23  There is thus a good economic reason 
to conclude that we are better off for having them in place than we would have 
been without them.24 
Likewise, many environmental programs defy standard forms of political 
failure analysis. Majoritarian influences have produced regulation that is far 
from symbolic, extracting significant environmental benefits from costly 
industry action.  Private compliance costs for environmental regulations are 
estimated to be around $150 billion per year and growing,25 and many of the 
costs are from programs that concentrated industry interests would not have 
chosen had they been in control of the process.  Analyses based on inter-
interest group and inter-sectional rivalries may be partially explanatory of 
some programmatic design and implementation decisions, but it is hard to 
believe that they are the sole explanations, and in some cases such as the 
regulation of automobile pollution, the relevant interest groups are heavily 
aligned against stringent regulation in nearly monolithic fashion, and yet 
regulation has still been stringent. 
 
 23. The difference between the policy failure stance and the alternative stance is one of 
emphasis.  Sometimes both perspectives are at work in a single assessment.  E.g., J. CLARENCE 
DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES: EVALUATING THE 
SYSTEM 148 (1998) (“When looked at as a whole, U.S. environmental progress has made 
economic sense.  It can be shown that benefits exceed costs in a great number of cases.  At the 
same time, it appears as if environmental gains have been achieved at unnecessarily high cost.”). 
 24. For a summary of the positive results of our air and water programs, see MARY 
GRAHAM, THE MORNING AFTER EARTH DAY: PRACTICAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 6-7 
(1999).  For an even rosier recitation, see GREG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON EARTH: THE 
COMING AGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL OPTIMISM (1995).  For the perspective that Easterbrook’s 
account is in places too rosy, see ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, A MOMENT OF TRUTH: 
CORRECTING THE SCIENTIFIC ERRORS IN GREGG EASTERBROOK’S A MOMENT ON THE EARTH 
(1995), available at http://www.ed.org/pubs/Reports/a_eastbrk.html (last visited May 25, 2001). 
 25. DAVIES & MAZUREK, supra note 23, at 123. 
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The conceptual reservation runs deeper.  The structure of the relationship 
between policy and politics that is implicit in the policy and political failure 
literature does not withstand scrutiny.  Carrying the logic of goal and obstacle 
to its limits, the implication is that environmental success could be 
satisfactorily achieved through the authoritarian imposition of environmental 
policies that were strongly opposed by the vast majority of Americans.  Indeed, 
on this view, norms of democratic decision-making and popular assent ought 
to be sacrificed if that would enable achieving the policy ideal.  The goal-and-
obstacle structure, in other words, is a structure in which the role of democratic 
decision-making is entirely instrumental, to be judged entirely by the results it 
achieves.  Because it always thwarts ideal policy, it is something to be 
maneuvered around. 
This is the wrong way to think of the relationship of policy to politics, for 
several reasons.  Precisely because authoritarian imposition of ideal policy is 
not an option for any social structure within which any of us would wish to 
live, some degree of public acceptability is an essential ingredient for sound 
public policy, not a flaw that amounts at most to a necessary evil.  Short of 
massive funding of an environmental police force, furthermore, cooperation 
between public and private actors will form a key component of any successful 
environmental program, which provides an entirely pragmatic reason to ground 
public policy in the public acceptance that normally attaches—at least 
presumptively—to programs that have been enacted through democratic 
processes.  Beyond such pragmatic considerations, democratic decision 
making practices reflect values independent of the instrumental consequences 
of the resulting policies.  Because they ought to acknowledge that individuals 
are to be treated with equal dignity and respect, acts of government require 
public justification through processes that are fair and open to all.  Democratic 
values are tragically foreshortened if politics is valued purely for the 
instrumental results that democracy produces. 
For reasons such as these, the structure of the relationship between policy 
and politics cannot be that of goal and obstacle.  It is better to think of it as a 
recipe.  Sound policy requires both justification against some instrumentalist 
ideal and public justification and acceptability through adoption by democratic 
institutions, and it requires an adequate amount of each.  Policy should not be 
slave to public passions or dominated by minority interests, but neither should 
it make the political processes through which policies are adopted lexically 
inferior to policy ideals.  To meet this joint requisite, environmental policy 
must be justified in terms of policy results, and also must be publicly justified 
through adoption by public institutions employing satisfactory processes.  The 
best environmental policy in terms of moving a democratic society toward a 
sustainable relationship between humankind and the biosphere is going to be 
one that will most likely not be perfect when judged against any policy ideal, 
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but it will nonetheless be the best policy insofar as it produces constructive, 
sustained and acceptable polices and programs.26 
Crucial to any recipe view of policy and politics is the idea that policy 
needs both to move us adequately in a constructive direction, judged against 
some normative ideal, and that it needs to be emerge from political processes 
that are sufficiently acceptable to sustain democratic legitimacy.  Currently, 
neither policy failure analysis nor political failure analysis possesses any 
cogent approach to assessing whether or not a given outcome or process is 
adequate, as opposed to ideal.  Each focuses on distinguishing the perfect from 
the imperfect, not on developing a theory of the adequate.  This essay cannot 
be the occasion to work out such a theory.  It can, however, provide an 
illustration of how environmental policy might be evaluated when the goal and 
obstacle perspective is changed to a recipe perspective.  The remainder of the 
essay will use the regulation of auto air emissions to illustrate some basic 
features of a recipe view of policy and politics.27 
Two minimum conditions are necessary, but almost certainly not 
sufficient, for any policy to be evaluated favorably under a recipe approach to 
policy and politics.  First, policy needs to do more good than harm in moving 
us toward a desirable objective.  Second, policy must be broadly acceptable to 
a majority of the public, in some sense that I will not attempt to define further 
here.  Viewed against these two minimum conditions, several features of our 
attempts to regulate air emissions from automobiles suggest that those efforts 
are candidates for favorable review under this approach, notwithstanding their 
many flaws.  Auto emissions policy has followed the path of majoritarian 
 
 26. Compare the similar idea developed by Gerald Gaus in his theory of constitution 
building and the liberal demand that constitutional principles require public justification. “To 
serve its purposes,” Gaus writes, 
a constitutional order must not only be justified, but must be widely perceived as 
such. . .As a moral agent, [one] must decide what arrangements are most conducive to 
honoring his commitment to justify himself; confronted with a choice between an ideal 
constitution and a less than ideal constitution that is widely embraced, [he] may rightly 
concur that the latter actually is more conducive to moralized social relations.  To insist 
on what he believes to be right may lead to conflict, the breakdown of the political order, 
and a return to the state of anarchy in which moralized relations are not generally 
available. . . .[A] constitution that is less than perfect . . . may nevertheless be the best 
constitution from the perspective of actually leading a life informed by moralized 
relations. 
GERALD F. GAUS, JUSTIFICATORY LIBERALISM 214 (1995). 
 27. Regulation of automobile air emissions can be, and usually is, subsumed under the 
broader category of mobile source emissions regulation, which includes as regulatory targets 
trucks, buses, trains and planes as well as automobiles, and diesel powered as well as gasoline 
powered engines.  This essay concentrates on the automobile story, a story in itself sufficiently 
complicated as to allow reference only to its most significant features.  For an excellent summary 
of the overall mobile source program, and more details on auto emissions regulation, see Arnold 
W. Reitze, Jr., Mobile Source Air Pollution Control, 6 ENVTL. LAWYER 309 (2000). 
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acceptability at crucial stages, leaning toward programmatic decisions that 
were relatively popular and away from those that were not.  At those crucial 
moments, policy has not been dominated by minority influence.  Under the 
goal and obstacle view, policy failed to make the right choices at those 
moments because the policies chosen fell short of the ideal.  Despite having 
been less than perfect, however, auto air emissions regulations have proven 
constructive in achieving real emissions reductions in those emissions.  Thus, 
those regulations meet the two minimum conditions for favorable evaluation 
by a recipe understanding of policy and politics. 
A favorable evaluation can only be a provisional one, though, because we 
are at a point where auto emissions regulation needs to evolve further if it is to 
continue making progress.  Increases in vehicle miles traveled (VMT) will 
negate gains we have made in reducing emissions per mile traveled through 
exhaust emissions standards, evaporative emissions controls and the regulation 
of fuel content.  As those gains erode, the test of policy and politics will be 
whether additional steps can be enacted and implemented that take us to the 
next level of emissions reduction.  If we make a successful transition to yet 
more reductions of auto emissions through acceptable policy initiatives, it 
stands to reason that one factor in that success will have been the thirty plus 
years which we have already spent exploring alternatives and establishing a 
solid public awareness of the need for controls.  At this point, the jury is still 
out.  Nonetheless, the recipe perspective on policy and politics would not 
condemn the choices we have made so far.  Auto emissions policy to date as 
has the potential to end as a success story rather than a failure. 
II.  POLICY AND POLITICS IN REGULATING AUTO AIR EMISSIONS 
A. The Nature of the Problem 
Exhaust emissions from automobiles and other mobile sources have long 
been known to be major sources of air pollution, and writing federal 
regulations for them was a major feature of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1970 (1970 CAAA).28  As a result of those regulations and further rules 
established under the 1990 Amendments, automobiles coming off the assembly 
line are now capable of emitting 70 - 90% less of the criteria pollutants per 
vehicle miles traveled than they did in 1970, and their emission of lead has 
been reduced to zero as a result of removing lead from gasoline. 
Still, the contribution of automobile emissions to the nation’s total loading 
of air pollutants remains considerable.  Of the six criteria air pollutants, auto 
emissions account for three-quarters of the national total for carbon monoxide 
(CO), one half of the total for oxides of nitrogen (NOx), and forty percent of 
 
 28. See text accompanying notes 39 - 42. 
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the total for volatile organic compounds.29  These shares have remained 
relatively stable throughout the thirty-year period since passage of the 1970 
CAAA.30  Automobiles are also significant contributors to atmospheric 
loadings of the remaining two criteria pollutants, particulate matter and sulphur 
dioxide.  Hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) are emitted from automobiles at 
rates amounting to about 20% of the national HAP total.31  Finally, autos 
produce appreciable amounts of greenhouse gases, as well, contributing 32% 
of the nation’s carbon dioxide emissions in 1998.32  The elimination of lead 
from gasoline has been the outstanding success story of auto emissions control, 
dropping mobile source contribution to total airborne lead from 80% in 1970 to 
13% in 1997, and dropping the overall total to just 1/20th of what it was in 
1970.33 
The continuing major role played by mobile sources in many aspects of air 
quality is attributable to several causes.34  Actual performance of the 
automobile fleet does not achieve all the emissions reductions of which cars 
are technologically capable because EPA bases certification of new vehicles on 
tests that do not accurately reflect real driving conditions.  The performance of 
emission control equipment also deteriorates in use, and existing inspection 
and maintenance programs are inadequate to ensure that malfunctions are 
quickly corrected or deliberate tampering quickly identified.  Even if these 
contributors were eliminated, however, the “most serious danger to the success 
of mobile source controls programs [is] the continued upswing in auto 
usage.”35 
B. The Policy Options 
The problem of auto air emissions is but an instance of a wide category of 
pollution problems associated with the production of material goods or the 
conversion of matter into energy.  In all such cases, the process or activity 
generating the pollution can be schematized as consisting of three basic 
components: (1) raw materials are supplied as input to the process, (2) the 
process itself then modifies or combines these materials, (3) thereby creating 
 
 29. See Reitze, supra note 27, at 314-315 and sources cited. 
 30. See Figure 5.3 in ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:  LAW, 
SCIENCE & POLICY 543 (3d ed. 2000) (comparing relative shares of criteria pollutants attributable 
to major pollution sectors in 1970 to 1997). 
 31. Reitze, supra note 27, at 315. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  Lead is also the sole criteria pollutant to experience an enormous reduction in total 
emissions, from about 220,000 tons in 1970 to a little less than 4,000 tons in 1998.  So in 1998, 
mobile sources contribute a smaller percentage to a much smaller total than they did in 1970. 
 34. This paragraph summarizes points made by Craig Oren, in Craig Oren, Getting 
Commuters Out of Their Cars, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 141, 157-174 (1998). 
 35. Id. at 160.  See text accompanying notes 77-79. 
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the final product or output plus pollution as a by-product.  Complete analysis 
of the pollution control problem associated with such processes then requires 
consideration of a fourth component: (4) the frequency with which goods or 
services are produced. Reducing the adverse health and environmental effects 
of the pollution from such a process must necessarily rely upon changing one 
or more of these four components.  There are just these four possibilities: 
 Pollution Capture: Trap the pollution after it has been produced but 
before it has entered the environment. 
 Input Change: Change the raw materials going into the process to ones 
that result in less harmful pollution. 
 Process Change: Make changes in the process so that it accomplishes 
the same end function while generating less harmful pollution. 
 Frequency Reduction: Reduce the frequency with which the polluting 
process operates. 
In the course of approximately thirty-one years of regulating auto emissions,36 
federal policy has in one way or another tried each of these four techniques. 
The brisk review of the history of that policy in the following section of 
this essay shows how policy and politics have regularly interacted so that at 
many significant decision points, the regulatory process has tended to shy 
away from options perceived to be politically unpopular and toward those that 
were more popular.  The resulting mix of policies has emphasized pollution 
capture and input changes because these can be implemented in ways that 
target large corporations, and in which regulatory costs borne by automobile 
drivers and users are not immediately visible on a day to day basis.  It has also 
de-emphasized directly imposing process change or frequency reduction, each 
of which is for differing reasons politically unpopular.  Frequency reduction 
programs strike at the heart of American’s preferences for individual 
convenience and flexibility.  Imposing process change runs counter to the 
American sense that as between government and business, business has great 
advantages in entrepreneurial innovation, and that it is just such innovation that 
needs to be tapped in order to produce the technological improvements crucial 
to solving environmental problems.37  Government should set the goals and 
 
 36. This essay begins its account of auto emissions policy with the enactment of the Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (Dec. 31, 1970) [hereinafter 
1970 CAAA].  For the earlier history, see FRANK GRAD ET AL., THE AUTOMOBILE AND THE 
REGULATION OF ITS IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT (1974); JAMES F. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, 
POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH 
MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION 1940 - 1975 (1977). 
 37. One of the clearest instances of this general aversion is the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, which impose strict regulations on the handling of hazardous wastes after they are 
produced, but which avoids regulating the production of those wastes.  “[R]ather than place 
restrictions on the generation of hazardous waste, which in many instances would amount to 
interference with the production process itself, the committee has limited the responsibility of the 
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protect against externalities, but it should not pick technological winners and 
losers.  Aided by these supporting values, industry has successfully resisted 
most proposals to mandate process changes,38 while losing many battles with 
respect to costly pollution capture measures.  Together, these preferences and 
values help explain why policy has shied away from direct process change 
mandates and frequency reduction programs. 
C. Highlights of Our Efforts to Reduce the Harmful Effects of Auto Emissions 
The single most debated provision of the precedent-breaking 1970 CAAA, 
in both the chambers of the Congress and in the media, was Congress’ mandate 
of a ninety percent reduction in hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide emissions 
from automobiles by the 1975 model year, as well as a similarly ambitious 
reduction in emissions of nitrogen oxides by the 1976 model year.39  Congress 
established these goals after estimating what contribution the reduction of auto 
emissions would have to make to achieve an overall objective of attaining air 
quality levels protective of public health and welfare.40  In reasoning backward 
from a public health objective in this way, the 90th Congress self-consciously 
“abandon[ed] the old assumption of requiring the use of only whatever 
technology is already proven and of permitting pollution to continue when it is 
not economically feasible to control it.”41  Congress had become frustrated 
with the old way of doing things because over the course of the 1950’s and 
 
generator for hazardous waste to one of providing information.”  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, 94th 
Cong. 26 (1976).  See also American Mining Cong. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1185-1186 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (construing RCRA’s jurisdiction as limited to materials that have exited from “the 
industry’s ongoing production process”). 
 38. The general political aversion to imposing direct process changes does not guarantee that 
legislation will never intrude on production process decisions.  After twenty years of small 
progress in controlling HAPs, for example, in 1990 Congress revised the HAPs provision of the 
CAA in such a way as to authorize EPA to set HAP standards based on what is achievable 
through “application of measures, processes, methods, systems or techniques including, but not 
limited to . . . process changes, substitution of materials or other modifications.”  42 U.S.C. § 
7412(d)(2) (2001).  Should EPA base a HAP standard on process modifications, the resulting 
standards would not legally compel industry to adopt the process modifications identified by EPA 
as the basis for that HAP standard—it would only compel plant performance equal to what EPA 
determines could be achieved by doing so—but practically speaking it would have that effect. 
 39. CAA Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. at 1690 (1970) (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2001)). 
 40. The estimates were based on analyses performed by the National Air Pollution Control 
Administration, a subunit of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, which was later 
incorporated into the Environmental Protection Agency.  For the history of their derivation, see 
GRAD, supra note 36, at 33-36. 
 41. Senate Debate on S. 4358, 116 CONG. REC. § 32919 (Sept. 21, 1970) (statement of 
Senator John Sherman Cooper (R-KY)), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93 
Cong. 1, Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, at 262 (Serial No. 93-18, 
1974) [hereinafter 1970 Leg. History]. 
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1960’s the State of California and the federal government had regularly 
engaged the automobile industry in conversations about the ability of that 
industry to abate emissions to satisfactory levels, only to be met as regularly by 
the response that this was a tough problem needing more research.  A solution 
would take a few years longer.42 
The auto emissions rollback provision passed squarely in the face of the 
auto industry’s insistence that such ambitious targets could not be met.  There 
can be little doubt that the auto industry vigorously opposed the 1970 tailpipe 
mandate,43 and hence little doubt that its passage constitutes an instance in 
which the presumptive rational choice advantages of such concentrated 
economic interests were defeated by a broad public health goal. 
The tailpipe mandate was also not a piece of symbolic legislation designed 
to gull the public into believing that their government had put a strong arm on 
industry, whereas the reality would turn out to be a failure of enforcement.  To 
the contrary, at the time of its conception, this and other technology-forcing 
provisions of the 1970 CAAA were thought by the Congress to be rational and 
appropriate means to change the incentive structure facing industry.  Over the 
course of the preceding fifteen years Congress had dealt with the auto industry 
and others on the basis of standards determined by what was technologically 
feasible, it had become aware that such regulations set up a perverse incentive 
for industry to slow walk through the development of innovative pollution 
reduction techniques, because success in innovation would only raise the worry 
that the next round of regulations would rachet down restrictions on emissions 
still further.  In the 1970 CAAA, Congress switched the incentives by setting 
an ambitious goal and then threatening sanctions for failure to meet it.  In this 
way, Congress sought to provide the industry with self-interested reasons to 
“stretch[] the [technological] possibilities . . . to find ways to do things that we 
are told in many, many instances cannot be done.”44 
As further evidence that Congress was trying to craft an effective program 
rather than engaging in symbolic posturing, the record shows that when 
Congress enacted the mandate, it explicitly acknowledged that the automobile 
industry might not be able to meet the ambitious goals it was setting.45  
Congress was not thereby enacting a law that would penalize firms for being 
 
 42. LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE REGULATION OF AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS FROM MOTOR 
VEHICLES 12 (1982). 
 43. See CHARLES O. JONES, CLEAN AIR: THE POLICIES AND POLITICS OF POLLUTION 
CONTROL 195-198 (1975). 
 44. EXECUTIVE SESSION OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS, 91st Cong. 114-
15 (Aug. 31, 1970) (remarks of Senator Muskie), Edmund S. Muskie Archives, Bates College, 
Lewiston, Maine, Folder SE 3041-4. 
 45. For a contrary view of the 1970 CAAA, see Ingram, supra note 16, at 22.  (“The 
characteristics of the air pollution issue in 1970 foreordained a policy-making process that 
concentrated on setting high goals without giving much attention to efficient implementation.”). 
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unable to do the impossible, nor was it irrationally proposing to shut down a 
major segment of the U.S. economy.46  To the contrary, Congress anticipated 
the possibility that the industry might return to them in several years seeking 
an extension, and it was assuming responsibility for revisiting its decision in 
subsequent years.  Under Congress’ plan, however, such reconsideration would 
only come after industry had engaged in several years of effort to meet the 
mandate, so that Congress would have both the benefit of the additional 
industry experience upon which to base subsequent deliberations, and the 
ability to assess the seriousness of the industry’s attempts.47  As Senator 
Muskie said to his colleagues on the Senate floor, “Congress, I assume, will be 
in session in 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974 and 1975 . . . The companies would be in 
a position to make their case.  If the Congress, which would have made the 
policy in the first instance, is persuaded that the industry cannot do the job, 
Congress could change the policy.”48  Asking for the problem to be brought 
back to the Congress for adjustments if it was not working was hardly a 
strategy for fooling the public with symbolic but empty rhetoric. 
As it turned out, Congress was indeed in session in 1974, when it 
postponed the goals for one model year.49  EPA granted an additional 
extension in 197550 and Congress followed suit once more in 1977.51  These 
extensions elongated the compliance period, but they did not entirely remove 
the pressure on the industry to find solutions to technical problems.  Congress 
was able to set lower standards for model years 1980 and 1981,52 and the 1990 
Amendments lowered them still further.53  Pursuant to study provisions 
contained in the 1990 Amendments, the EPA has recommended further 
 
 46. The 1970 CAAA provided for a $10,000 fine for each automobile sold without a 
certification that that car type met federal emissions standards. 
 47. Congress also built into the 1970 CAAA ability for the Administrator of the EPA to 
grant a one-year extension on the deadlines, if certain statutory conditions were met.  Upon a 
petition for such an extension, the Administrator declined to grant it—further evidence of the lack 
of interest group capture of the regulatory process.  The industry did persuade the D.C. Circuit to 
reverse the Administrator’s decision.  Int’l Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 
1973). 
 48. Senate Debate on S. 4358, 116 Cong. Rec. 32905 (Sept. 21, 1970) (remarks of Senator 
Muskie), reprinted in 1970 Leg. History, supra note 41, at 236. 
 49. The Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act, Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 
246 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3281, 3298. 
 50. Chrysler Corp., Ford Motor Co., and General Motors Corp., Applications for Suspension 
of 1977 Motor Vehicle Exhaust Emissions Standards; Decision of Administrator, 40 Fed. Reg. 
11,900 (1975). 
 51. Pub. L. No. 95-95, §§ 201, 202(b), 91 Stat. 685, 751-52. 
 52. Id. 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (g). 
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tightening of the exhaust emissions standards as so-called Tier II measures.54  
The 1990 Amendments also contain provisions tightening controls on 
evaporative losses, which result from vapor leakages around the various 
components of the fuel system, as well as from refueling itself. 
One of the perplexities of retrospective policy analysis is that one can 
seldom be totally confident about what would have happened had a regulation 
not been put into place, so that one can seldom determine conclusively the net 
impact of that regulation.  In the case of the auto emissions mandate, it is 
possible that the auto industry would have solved the technical problems 
associated with the catalytic converter just as quickly as they did once the 
mandate of the 1970 CAAA was put in place.55  Evidence from early studies of 
the effects of the standards argues decidedly against that possibility, 
however.56  Early statistical analyses attribute considerable explanatory power 
to the legislative standards for reducing levels of auto emissions.57  The 
mandate thus did not amount to an “aspirational” command that produced very 
little by way of additional progress.58  Even if the industry could be confident 
that EPA and Congress would not actually shut the industry down, mere 
“cosmetic efforts industry felt compelled to make in order to establish its good 
faith could not, given the resourcefulness of its engineers, but have produced 
some improvement.”59 
The 1970 emissions reduction mandate was a tough, calculated effort to 
incentivize the auto industry to lower auto emissions, and as such a substantial 
 
 54. U.S. EPA, Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor Vehicle 
Emissions Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control Requirements 65 Fed. Reg. 6698 (Feb. 10, 
2000). 
 55. As it was, the subsequent extensions of the 1975/76 deadlines may be taken as some 
vindication of the Nixon administration’s initial proposal for a 1980 deadline.  In the context of 
the political struggle between President Nixon and Senator Muskie for the environmental vote, 
the Senate’s cutting the deadline in half had political implications in addition to whatever the 
public health consequences of first imposing and then relaxing a tight standard might have been.  
The political dynamics of 1969-70 and how they may have affected environmental legislation are 
explored in Elliott, Ackerman & Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution, 1 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 313 (1985). 
 56. E.g., ROBERT CRANDALL ET AL., REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE 92 (1986) (“There is 
little evidence to support the view that emissions rates would have fallen significantly without the 
emissions standards program.”). 
 57. LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE REGULATION OF AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS FROM MOTOR 
VEHICLES 47 (1981).  In addition, the higher emissions standards being observed in other 
developed countries, such as Canada and the Western European countries, without mandatory 
standards lends further support to the conclusion that the standards had real effects.  See 
CRANDALL, supra note 56, at 93. 
 58. The classic critique of so-called aspirational statutes—ones that sound nice but cannot 
possibly be met—is Henderson & Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The 
Limits of “Spirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. (1978). 
 59. See DAVID CURRIE, AIR POLLUTION: FEDERAL LAW AND ANALYSIS 2-114 (1981). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
38 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:21 
defeat for the automobile manufacturers.  From an elected official’s 
perspective, it was also a wonderful conjunction of a promising regulatory 
strategy and political popularity.  In the years immediately preceding passage 
of the 1970 CAAA, the auto industry had badly damaged its public image as 
the result of two separate incidents.  First, General Motor’s representatives had 
confessed publicly before the Congress that it had hired a private investigator 
to snoop into the private life of Ralph Nader after publication of his broadside 
against the auto industry, Unsafe At Any Speed.60  Second, the Justice 
Department had sued the auto industry for collusion in suppressing the 
development of control technology, leading to a consent decree that prohibited 
joint activities regarding pollution control.61  As a result, the public was well 
primed to believe that the automobile industry was not to be trusted when it 
denounced sharper emissions reductions as impossible to achieve, that the 
industry was in fact capable of doing more and doing better, and that tough 
government insistence on industry action was an appropriate way to deal with 
their recalcitrance.62 
At the same time as the mandate was a politically attractive regulatory 
option, further legal directives aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of that 
mandate were not.  Pollution control equipment deteriorates in use, so that 
passing a controlled emissions test with vehicles fresh out of the factory cannot 
certify that those vehicles will continue to emit no more than allowable 
emissions once they are on the road.  Testing and estimates by EPA in 1982 
 
 60. RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN-DANGERS OF THE 
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE (1965). 
 61. United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass’n, 199 Trade Cas. ¶ 72902 (C.D. Cal. 1969); 
Goldstein & Howard, Antitrust Law and the Control of Auto Pollution, Rethinking the Alliance 
Between Competition and Technical Progress, 10 ENVTL. L. 517 (1980). 
 62.  
The political climate that ultimately precipitated the stringent emissions standards began 
to develop in 1965, when Ralph Nader published his famous indictment of the industry 
and was treated to a personal investigation at the industry’s expense.  Seldom has an 
attempt at intimidation backfired so spectacularly.  The Nader affair led to a dramatic set 
of hearings in which the president of General Motors was forced to apologize to Nader in 
front of a congressional committee and a national television audience.  Serious and 
lingering damage was done to the political credibility of the automobile manufacturers—
damage soon compounded by allegations concerning their handling of the air pollution 
problem itself. . . .[Los Angeles County] supervisors charged that [a joint auto industry 
committee set up to conduct pollution control research] was in fact a collusive 
arrangement to prevent the introduction of controls.  As evidence that industry 
developments were being suppressed rather than propagated, they cited the package of 
control devices developed by Chrysler but kept off the market until California legislation 
forced its introduction. . . . This incident unquestionably added to the public’s impression 
of recalcitrance and bad faith on the part of the industry. 
Henry D. Jacoby & John D. Steinbruner, The Context of Current Policy Discussion, in CLEARING 
THE AIR 10-11 (Henry D. Jacoby et al. eds., 1973). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] REGULATING AUTOMOBILE POLLUTION 39 
indicated that total actual emissions from autos on the road ranged from 5% 
(for NOx) to 76% (for CO) higher than they would be if actual performance 
matched the statutory emissions requirements.63  In 1993 model year studies, 
the comparable figures were between 50% and 400%.64  Programs of 
inspection and maintenance (I & M) can markedly reduce this discrepancy, by 
ensuring that the pollution control equipment installed on automobiles remains 
in good repair.  Normal wear and tear is not the only obstacle to achieving 
actual reductions commensurate with the statutory standards.  Late 1970’s 
studies by EPA suggested that auto owners tampered with nearly 20% of new 
automobiles to disable their emissions equipment in order to achieve better 
performance.65  Such tampering can also be minimized through I & M 
requirements. 
Despite their evident ability to reduce emissions, I & M programs have 
foundered throughout the history of the CAA.66  They have encountered 
resistance partly because the technologies for performing the inspections are 
themselves far from perfect, so that there has been some skepticism about their 
actual ability to produce air quality improvements.67  At the same time, the 
onus of justifying these programs imposes a heavy burden on EPA and the 
states because the programs are so inconvenient and time consuming for the 
driving public that neither the federal government nor the states are eager to be 
identified as the one imposing highly objectionable programs on the driving 
public. 
In addition to emissions control mandates, from its very inception United 
States auto emissions policy has also included the regulation of fuel content.  
The most dramatically effective single measure in our entire auto emissions 
policy has been the removal of lead from gasoline.68  Under the 1970 CAAA, 
unleaded gasoline was required to be made available to fuel new vehicles, 
 
 63. CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 56, at 94-95. 
 64. Oren, supra note 34 at 158.  Some of this discrepancy is attributable to the inability of 
the standard federal testing protocol for autos to match actual driving conditions, under which 
motorists experience circumstances such as sharp accelerations, which drive up actual emissions.  
Id. 
 65. LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE REGULATION OF AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS FROM MOTOR 
VEHICLES 70 (1981). 
 66. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 30, at 619-620 (a brief summary of problems with I & 
M programs); see also Todd A. Stewart, E-Check: A Dirty Word in Ohio’s Clean Air Debate—
Ohio’s Battle Over Automobile Emissions Testing, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 265 (2001) (detailing one 
state’s problems with its I & M efforts). 
 67. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER §3.29 n.42, 
and sources cited (Pocket Part, 2000) (complaints about the effectiveness of testing leads to 
resistance to implementing I & M programs). 
 68. For a more complete review of the interesting history of the elimination of lead from 
gasoline, see Thomas McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing in Environmental Regulation, 27 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943, 947-952 (1994). 
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because the lead in gasoline destroys the catalysts in the catalytic converters 
that became the technology of choice for meeting the exhaust mandates.69  
Lead came under further scrutiny due to its adverse health effects.  Operating 
under a provision of the CAA that permitted regulation of gasoline additives 
that “will endanger the public health or welfare,” in 1973 the Administrator 
ordered a reduction in the lead content in all gasolines.70  That decision 
ultimately was sustained by the D.C. Circuit in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,71 one of 
the landmark cases ratifying the precautionary nature of modern environmental 
legislation.  Subsequently, continuing problems with misfueling and additional 
research into the adverse health effects of lead prompted the Congress to order 
the complete removal of lead when the Air Act was amended in 1990.72 
Over the years, we have learned more about how the composition of 
gasoline can be tweaked to achieve emissions reductions.  The 1990 
Amendments called for the use of reformulated gasoline (RFG) in areas that 
remained significantly in non-attainment for ozone.  Currently, the RFG 
requirement applies on a mandatory basis to nine metropolitan areas, with 
other areas able to elect its use as part of an overall air quality maintenance 
strategy.  The mandatory areas alone encompass 22% of all the gasoline sold in 
the United States, and the reformulated product produces 15% fewer 
hydrocarbon emissions than normal gasoline—plus reducing HAPs emissions, 
as well.73 
New requirements in both pollution capture and fuel content have been 
developed throughout the history of auto air emissions control, and are 
continuing still.  EPA as announced the so-called Tier II emissions standards, 
with will lower NOx from the current 0.4 gpm to 0.07 gpm.  It also proposes 
gradually to bring light-duty trucks and SUVs into compliance with roughly 
the same tailpipe standards as apply to autos.74  EPA has also successfully 
brokered development of a national low emissions vehicle (NLEV) program 
under which automobile manufacturers will market nationwide vehicles 
 
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (2001). 
 70. 38 Fed. Reg. 33, 734 (1973). 
 71. 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(n) (2001). 
 73. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 30, at 612-13. 
 74. U.S. EPA, Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor Vehicle 
Emissions Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 6698 (Feb. 10, 
2000).  Pollution capture regulations now also encompass on board computer diagnostic systems 
(OBD) designed to signal motorists when evaporative emissions or exhaust emissions standards 
have been exceeded, and to facilitate proper maintenance by making diagnostic information 
available to mechanics. 
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meeting California’s LEV emissions standards.75  As to fuel content, EPA has 
announced rules reducing the sulphur content of gasoline.76 
The accomplishments of these measures have been considerable.  For some 
time, however, policy makers have recognized that such success alone will not 
be sufficient to continue to make truly substantial reductions in the emissions 
from automobiles.  Total atmospheric loading from autos depends upon the 
frequency with which autos are used and upon the processes autos use to 
convert matter to energy as much as it does upon the inputs used and the 
manner in which outputs are captured.77  Without measures taken to alter these 
first two factors, increased auto use threatens to swamp tailpipe and fuel 
content standards.  To illustrate, EPA has estimated that by year 2015, total 
vehicle miles traveled (VMT) by autos in the United States will have increased 
nearly four fold since 1970, and this increase will have the effect of reversing 
the slope of the annual hydrocarbons emissions curve from decreasing to 
increasing.78  The combination of increasing population, increased VMT per 
capita, and extremely low occupancy rates has proven to be a devastating 
combination counteracting emissions gains made elsewhere.79 
The 1970 CAAA contemplated a role for frequency reduction, in the form 
of transportation control measures (TCMs), as part of an overall air quality 
management strategy for automobiles.  In this instance, the contemplation was 
much more symbolic than actual.  Over the years, frequency reduction plans 
have proven to be the third rail of air pollution policy.  EPA itself received one 
of the first shocks when it responded to the failure of the Los Angeles air basin 
to submit an implementation plan that would meet the original statutory 
compliance dates.  Obligated by statute to fill in the resulting regulatory gap, in 
1975 EPA proposed a federal implementation plan (FIP) that utilized drastic 
gasoline rationing measures among its strategies to reduce vehicle miles 
traveled sufficiently to meet the attainment deadlines.80  The move proved so 
unpopular that Congress shortly stripped the EPA of the authority to include 
TCMs as part of a FIP.81 
 
 75. U.S. EPA, Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle 
Engines: State Commitments to National Low Emission Vehicle Program, 63 Fed. Reg. 926 (Jan. 
7, 1998). 
 76. 65 Fed. Reg. 6698. 
 77. Id. 
 78. U.S. EPA website, at http://www.epa.gov/oms/04-ozone.htm. 
 79. While VMT have gone up, occupancy rates have actually declined, exacerbating the 
problem of vehicle use.  Vehicle occupancy dropped from 1.3 passengers per trip to and from 
work in 1977 to 1.1 in 1990.  Oren, supra note 34, at 163 (citing Federal Highway Administration 
statistics). 
 80. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 30, at 619 (recounting history of Los Angeles FIP). 
 81. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c). 
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Historically, while states have always retained authority to include more 
aggressive TCMs in their implementation, measures that have been attempted, 
such as car pool lanes, car free downtown areas, restrictions on parking, and 
other such have had negligible impacts on auto use and have consequently 
contributed insignificantly to the overall improvement in air quality. 
When Congress wrote the 1990 Amendments, it enacted a new variant to 
such measures, one that focused its attention on large employers and only 
obliquely regulated individual car users. The 1990 trip reduction program 
directed major employers in the same non attainment metropolitan areas as are 
covered by the RFG requirement to create programs and revise company 
policies so as to achieve reductions in solo employee computes during rush 
hour, or to shift such trips out of the rush hours.82  Implementation planning for 
the trip reduction program proved disastrous and highly unpopular, and 
Congress repealed the measure before the trip reduction plans were to go into 
effect.83  The trip reduction program may well have been a flawed policy from 
its inception.84  Even so, its huge unpopularity was more a product of the fact 
that “the ability of employers to persuade employees to reach work other than 
by driving alone is limited by the unattractiveness of the alternatives,”85 than of 
any influential cost-effectiveness critique.  In the short term, TCMs are 
unlikely to play any substantial role in emissions reduction policy precisely 
because they are so unattractive to the motoring public. 
In fact, the federal governments overall policy toward frequency of 
automobile use has actually undermined air quality improvement goals.  
Federal emissions control programs have attempted to reduce auto emissions 
primarily through pollution capture and input change efforts.  After thirty years 
of development, these are now experiencing diminishing returns.  At the same 
time, other federal policies have been making reliance on the automobile even 
more attractive compared to the alternatives, and hence politically even harder 
to change.  Those other policies do not come from any environmental statute, 
but rather from the role of the federal government in developing and 
maintaining our national highway system.  They have had the effect of 
encouraging the use of highways, and to increase VMT, both indirectly and 
directly.  First, the federal government is a major funder of highway 
construction and maintenance.  Both in the current transportation bill, TEA-
 
 82. Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 103, 104 Stat. 2399, 2438 (1990) (enacting § 182(d) of the Clean 
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(d) (1994)) (repealed 1995). 
 83. The details of the trip reduction program and its demises have been exhaustively studied 
by Craig Oren.  See Oren, supra note 34.  See also Craig Oren, The Mandate From Hell: How the 
Trip Reduction Program Came Into Being, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 123 (1998). 
 84. This is Craig Oren’s conclusion.  See supra note 83. 
 85. Oren, supra note 34, at 222. 
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21,86 as well as its immediate predecessor, ISTEA,87 the federal government 
allocates approximately forty billion dollars a year to transportation, all but a 
minuscule amount of which goes to new construction, maintenance and 
repair.88 
By improving the conditions of our highways, federal policy lowers the 
costs of using them, and thus encourages their use.  Beyond this direct effect 
on VMT, however, transportation policy also has the effect of facilitating the 
phenomenon of urban sprawl, thus stimulating conditioned reliance on the 
automobile by increasing the costs of alternatives.  Urban sprawl facilitates the 
dispersal of population centers as well as employment centers.  Whereas well-
defined residential areas combined with few and well-defined central business 
districts create conditions conducive to successful and efficient mass transit, 
decentralized population and employment centers make mass transit 
convenient and economical enough to compete with the automobile as an 
attractive alternative practically impossible.89  Highway policy attests 
dramatically to the influence that Americans’ love affair with their automobiles 
has had on air pollution.  The politically attractive choices made in this area 
have contributed more to the air pollution problem than they have as of yet to 
its solution.90 
Our policies toward process change in the auto emissions area have been 
more mixed than those toward frequency reduction.  Consistent with the 
country’s aversion to direct government designation of acceptable 
technologies, federal policy has not sought to direct the industry to build 
substitutes to the internal combustion engine (ICE).  In 1969, Senator Gaylord 
Nelson had introduced a bill to abolish the ICE, but the greatest pay off from 
that proposal through Senator Muskie’s use of it to persuade some of his 
 
 86. The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 23, 49 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1999)). 
 87. Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 
Stat. 1914 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). 
 88. See Federal Highway Administration at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/tea21/funding.htm.  
On the transportation legislation and its environmental impacts, see Liam A. McCann, TEA-21: 
Paving Over Efforts To Stem Urban Sprawl, and Reduce America’s Dependence on the 
Automobile, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 857 (1999). 
 89. See McCann, supra note 88. 
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driving patterns.  More women in the workplace, the entrance of the baby boom generation into 
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see Oren, supra note 34, at 160-174. 
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colleagues to vote for his more moderate set of Clean Air Act Amendments.91  
In 1979, Congress missed an opportunity to use its bail out of the then failing 
Chrysler Corporation as the occasion to impose conditions on Chrysler’s use of 
public funds that would have made Chrysler a leader in developing alternatives 
to the ICE. 
On the other hand, aggressive pursuit of tailpipe standards may have the 
effect of producing incentives for the introduction of alternative propulsion 
technologies into the personal automobile.  The leader in this strategy has been 
the state of California, not the federal government.  In 1990, California 
embarked on a plan to stimulate the production of a zero emissions vehicle. 
(ZEV).92  Under the original formulation of its plan, automobile manufacturers 
were to generate sales of ZEVs on a gradually increasing scale that eventually 
would amount to ten percent of the new car sales market statewide by the year 
2003.93  In the years subsequent, California successively suspended the 
intermediate requirements of producing two to five percent ZEV sales in the 
years prior to 2003.  On September 7, and 8, 2000, however, the California Air 
Resources Board considered a petition from industry to suspend the 2003 ten 
percent requirement altogether.  Rather than agreeing, the “Board . . . resolved 
that the basic [ten percent] ZEV requirement be retained and implemented.”94  
California’s ZEV requirement is technology forcing with respect to alternatives 
to the ICE in the same way as the federal tailpipe standards have been 
technology-forcing with respect to the catalytic converter. 
California’s ten percent requirement can partially be met by the sale of cars 
satisfying a PZEV requirement.95  Because total compliance cannot be 
achieved in this or any other manner except by actually selling a number of 
ZEVs, however, production and sale of some ZEVs will be necessary for 
manufacturers to comply with the mandate.  With respect to stimulating 
changes from the ICE, this fact is a crucial feature of California’s program, 
because although the PZEV requirements can be met by vehicles using ICEs or 
 
 91. Interview with Leon Billings (April 1, 2000). 
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hybrid ICE/electric motor systems, the ZEV requirements cannot.  ZEVs must 
be vehicles powered by either batteries or fuel cells.  Thus a real ZEV standard 
pushes the development of such alternative vehicles, and provides the best 
prospect we currently have to harness the innovation and entrepreneurial 
creativity that industry has always asserted as the justification for government 
to set the goals and then permit industry to meet them. 
The current competition between battery-powered vehicles and those using 
fuel cells illustrates this entrepreneurial and competitive process.  When the 
ZEV program was first introduced, the major focus of attention was the 
battery-powered auto.  Improvements in battery capacity and weight sufficient 
to make electric cars widely attractive have proven illusive over the past 
decade, however.  At this stage in their development, battery-powered vehicles 
are saddled with limited range, small size and burdensome recharge 
requirements that suggest they will never achieve major market penetration.  
Attention and expectations have recently begun to shift to the fuel cell, with 
some analysts now predicting that it is the fuel cell that will be the technology 
of choice in a transition to so-called sustainable mobility.96 
It is not clear whether research on alternative vehicles can produce 
products acceptable to an appreciable portion of the automobile buying public. 
Nor is it clear whether California will be able to maintain its ZEV requirement 
only by the expedient of extending the compliance date.  If it does extend the 
date, the history with the federal tailpipe standards should counsel caution in 
announcing the failure of the ZEV mandate on that account.  The federal 
timetable was relaxed several times, but the goals originally set in 1970 were 
never abandoned, and they were eventually met and exceeded.97  Earnest 
technology-forcing seems much more promising as a means to gain the 
progress that it needed here than does a policy that fails to include technology-
forcing features. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Over the past three decades, auto air emissions regulations have achieved 
genuine and significant reductions in the production of health and environment 
harmful pollution from the on-the-road fleet of automobiles.  These regulations 
have imposed substantial costs on industry and hence on the consuming public.  
We are better off to have had them in place.  The pattern of our approach to 
regulation shows a clear tendency to shy away from strategies that would 
prove unpopular with the American public and toward those that were either 
affirmatively popular or else broadly acceptable to the public.  That meant we 
 
 96. Presentation by Lee Lynd, Professor of Chemical and Biochemical Engineering, 
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2001) (copies on file with the author). 
 97. See pages 36 to 37, above. 
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lost opportunities for more substantial gains, and our policies have certainly 
deviated from an ideal policy, whatever ideal policy one chooses.  Under a 
recipe view of the between policy and politics, falling short of policy 
perfection is not a sufficient ground for condemning the policies that 
democratic institutions have promulgated. 
As to whether or not regulation of auto air emissions might be called an 
environmental success story, the jury is still out.  The political dynamics 
preventing sterner frequency reduction measures or the direct imposition of 
alternatives to the ICE promise to prevent use of such policy tools any time 
soon, and the diminishing prospects of further returns from fuel content and 
tailpipe emissions controls may soon be more than offset by the progress-
canceling consequences of increased VMT.  Achieving the ultimate reductions 
that are necessary for long-term success, therefore, seems heavily dependent 
upon technology-forcing strategies such as the California ZEV approach.  
Should those strategies succeed in turning the crucial corner toward market-
acceptable alternative vehicles, history will record ours as a period of a 
successful transition to more sustainable mobility.  In that case, the political 
success of the past thirty years in maintaining strong citizen support for some 
sort of on going pollution reduction efforts may well be considered an essential 
element of that success story.  If so, the mix of policy and politics in the 
regulation of auto air emissions will prove to have been much more 
satisfactory than a reading of either the policy failure literature or the political 
failure literature would suggest. 
 
